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Recent upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya have caught many by surprise as 
the order of things has proven protean in a way that official experts and conventional 
wisdom were largely blind to – reality, it seems, can be unruly. As revolution unfolded in 
Egypt there were many pleas for restraint, worries that political instability would spread, 
and  among  Western  leaders  a  profound  wariness  of  change  that  they  feared  would 
compromise their strategic interests. There was, in a word, an invocation of ‘realism’, 
intended to quell the earnestness of fast moving and profound change. The failure of 
realism as a response to recent events in Egypt is revealed through the policies invoked by 
state representatives, commentators and academics, which confirmed the given reality of 
world politics but proved wanting ethically and heuristically, as those willing to support 
the brutal rule of Hosni Mubarak and unable to comprehend the power of the protesters 
proved to be on the wrong side of history. These banal appeals to realism, however, do 
lead to a broader insight, revealing that such appeals in world politics are actually calls to 
preserve what I term ‘the reality of dominance’, which invokes the inevitability of the 
existing order of things to discount the reality of resistance to that order – which calls for 
transformation over preservation. 
In early February, before Mubarak’s ouster, the Egyptian revolution was in 
doubt. It was still only a fragile possibility.1 The protestors and Mubarak’s goons waited it 
out in Tahrir Square while the army stood watch. The success of the revolution would be 
determined by whose will was most resilient. Would the threat of increasing violence 
discourage the protestors and give Mubarak the space he needed to solidify his power till 
next year and thus avoid the changes the Egyptian people were demanding? Or would the 
protestors’ resolve hold, making clear to Mubarak that he could no longer hope to rule 
Egypt? 
  As  protestors  faced  violence,  exhaustion  and  deprivation  the  prospect  of 
compromise must have seemed more desirable as the hardships mounted. The time was 
ripe for expressions of support from key leaders, which could buttress the resolve of the 
protestors and pressure the Mubarak regime. It was much easier for Mubarak to play for 
time from the presidential palace than for protesters in the streets, yet far too many of the 
men  and  women  able  to  make  a  difference  did  not  use  their  voices  to  share  in Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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democracy’s street-choir – instead their voices echoed in the halls of disreputable power. 
The Obama administration has the greatest culpability in this, as they not only had the 
capability to undermine Mubarak, but their failure to do so revealed the hypocrisy of US 
support for democracy and human rights in the region. 
  The events in Egypt demonstrated that President Barak Obama has mastered 
the  dark  art  of  evasive  support,  leaving  no  doubt  that  he  fully  supported  Egyptian 
democracy, as long as it did not change too much, too fast, and, most importantly, as long 
as US strategic interests were not compromised. 
 
The administration’s restraint is also driven by the fact that, for the United 
States, dealing with an Egypt without Mr. Mubarak would be difficult at best, 
and downright scary at worst. For 30 years, his government has been a pillar of 
American foreign policy in a volatile region. (Sanger & Cooper, 2011)  
 
Predictably, Vice President Joe Biden made the point with less tact, but perhaps more 
truth, when he expressed his insensibility to the crimes of Mubarak against his own 
people: 
 
Asked  if  he  would  characterize  Mubarak  as  a  dictator  Biden  responded: 
“Mubarak has been an ally of ours in a number of things. And he’s been very 
responsible on, relative to geopolitical interest in the region, the Middle East 
peace efforts; the actions Egypt has taken relative to normalizing relationship 
with – with Israel. … I would not refer to him as a dictator.” (Murphy, 2011)  
 
Clearly regional stability is the key rhetorical trope, which justified turning a blind eye to 
the brutality of Mubarak’s regime and the lack of democracy in Egypt.  
  Perhaps no issue is more important in defining what “regional stability” means 
for the US than the issue of Israeli security. Binyamin Netanyahu clearly exerted pressure 
on the US, trying to limit the support they gave to democratic reforms in Egypt. 
 
The prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, reportedly ordered his cabinet to 
refrain from commenting publicly on the unfolding drama, saying only that the 
treaty must be maintained. But as Haaretz reported today, the government is 
seeking to convince the US and EU to curb their criticism of Hosni Mubarak 
to preserve stability in the region, even as Washington and its allies signal their 
wish for an “orderly transition” which the incumbent almost certainly cannot 
ignore. (Black, 2011) 
 
Despite the homilies on human rights and democratic freedom delivered by Mr Obama Egypt and the Failure of Realism, Hoover  
 
 
 
129 
to the Egyptians (Wilson and Warrick, 2011), it was a predictable set of concerns that set 
the agenda for the US response to the revolution taking place in Cairo and throughout 
Egypt  –  the  imperative  was  to  maintain  order,  control  those  changes  that  proved 
inevitable and ensure that the political and economic interests of dominant states were 
preserved.    The  representative  for  the  US  State  Department,  PJ  Crowley,  who  was 
interviewed by Al Jazeera (US urges reform in Egypt, 2011), performed a practiced dance 
to the theme of restraint, gradual reform and false equivalencies – as if protesters and the 
agents of Mubarak’s “coercive apparatus” could be compared2 – as he made clear that the 
suffering of the Egyptian people and their desire for democracy would not undermine US 
support for the Mubarak regime.   
 
We respect what Egypt contributes to the region. It is a stabilising force; it has 
made its own peace with Israel and is pursuing normal relations with Israel. We 
think that’s important; we think that’s a model that the region should adopt 
broadly speaking. At the same time, we recognise that Egypt, Tunisia, other 
countries, do need to reform, they do need to respond to the needs of their 
people and we encourage that reform and we are contributing across the region 
to that reform. (US urges reform in Egypt, 2011) 
 
This routine, we can assume, was an exercise in managing expectations and making US 
interests clear – democratic revolution should not be allowed to upset regional stability, 
nor should the suffering of the protestors be allowed to cloud “our” judgment on what 
really matters – or, more bluntly, if democratic dreams threatened the interests of the US, 
then so much the worse for those beautiful revolutionary dreams.  
As Tony Blair joined the discussion he not only underlined Biden’s scepticism 
regarding whether Mubarak was a dictator, claiming he was ‘immensely courageous and a 
force for good’ (McGreal, 2011), but he also clearly articulated the managerial worldview 
of a man who has learned to think of himself as a member of a privileged group of clear-
eyed realists whose responsibility it is to control all the things of world politics.  
 
Blair argued that the region has unique problems that make political change 
different  from  the  democratic  revolutions  in  Eastern  Europe.  He  said  the 
principal  issue  was  the  presence  of  Islamist  parties  that  he  fears  will  use 
democracy to gain power and then undermine the freedoms people seek... Blair 
said he did not doubt that change was coming to Egypt. “People want a different 
system of government. They’re going to get it. The question is what emerges 
from that. In particular I think the key challenge for us is how do we help partner 
this process of change and help manage it in such a way that what comes out of it Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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is open minded, fair, democratic government.” (McGreal, 2011)  
 
Not only does this response implicitly trade in the notion that Arab countries will not be 
able to handle democracy without Western tutelage, it also trades in a degraded notion of 
realism, in which serious men act as if their apologia for imperial arrogance is sagacious 
wisdom gleaned from long experience. The Egyptian protestors will be allowed their 
democracy, but their democracy will be managed and defined by the powerful, so as not 
to disturb the order of things or run afoul of the realities of world politics. 
Yet this statist and status quo line is actually divorced from reality, or at least 
the  reality  of  the  protesters  battling  their  corrupt  leaders  in  the  streets  of  Cairo, 
Alexandria and cities throughout Egypt – it reflects the reality of dominance. Realism, as 
Western leaders express it, is little more than an attempt to limit the happenings of world 
politics  to  their  own  constrained  vision,  a  myopic  self-interest  that  fails  to  take  the 
measure of the cruelty it justifies or realise its own analytical failings. 
  There is an obvious danger contained in the argument I have made thus far – it 
is all too easy to equate the political calculations of state representatives with a realist 
theory of International Relations. A committed realist may well respond by suggesting 
that the problem highlighted by the US response to the Egyptian revolution is not realism 
in foreign policy but the shoddy analysis and muddled thinking of these all too human 
leaders of women and men. And I need not speculate about this potential realist, as 
Stephen Walt (2011) has already made the argument for getting rid of Mubarak. Making 
the case that a consistent realist policy, focused on the strategic self-interest of involved 
states, should have led the US and Israel to support a democratic Egypt and the ouster of 
Mr  Mubarak  –  all  the  while,  of  course  focusing  on  how  such  a  transition  benefits 
dominant states and must be properly managed to ensure the stability of the international 
system – Walt says: 
 
Other things being equal, states are better off if they don’t have to worry about 
their allies’ internal stability, and if an allied government enjoys considerable 
support  among  its  population.  An  ally  that  is  internally  divided,  whose 
government is corrupt or illegitimate, or that is disliked by lots of other countries 
is  ipso  facto  less  valuable  than  one  whose  population  is  unified,  whose 
government is legitimate, and that enjoys lots of international support. For this 
reason, even a staunch realist would prefer allies that were neither internally 
fragile nor international pariahs, while recognizing that sometimes you have to 
work with what you have. 
 
While there is an admirable consistency and clarity to this argument, it serves to highlight 
the failure of realism as a theoretical framing. It is not a problem of analysis but a problem Egypt and the Failure of Realism, Hoover  
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of understanding. Whether we are looking to Walt’s sober instrumentalism, or the more 
mundane  realism  that  the  Obama  administration  embraced  while  the  outcome  of 
rebellion in Egypt was still in doubt, the appeal is only to the reality of dominance, which 
preserves stability and order ahead of and, if necessary, at the cost of the pains and dreams 
of the protestors – ignoring the reality of resistance. Despite its pretensions, realism, as an 
orientation  and  a  theory,  does  not  grant  special  access  to  some  indisputable  or 
unchanging reality, rather it invokes reality for political ends. 
My criticism does not apply only to those writers who self-identify as realists, 
but  to  a  brand  of  statist  thinking  that  justifies  the  narrowness  of  its  analysis,  the 
instrumentalisation of moral concerns, and its principled elevation of order above all 
other  values  in  the  name  of  the  undeniable  realities  of  international  politics.3  The 
fundamental claim shared by those who privilege state interests and the preservation of 
order is that international politics demands such qualities of us. Historically, this realist 
position has been contrasted with putatively utopian views (whether internationalist, 
idealist, socialist, or cosmopolitan) that cannot see the world of international politics for 
what it is, which fail to see that focusing on state interest and perpetual conflict is not 
immoral but the only sober response to the imperatives of the world – and because of 
that the moral policy demanded of states (Cozette, 2008).  
  What goes unchallenged is exactly which reality realists are better able to grasp. 
The too-often-unspoken truth is that they embrace the reality of powerful actors, of those 
seeking to dominate, control, exploit and to render social reality into the means for their 
various ends. Realism, as the dominant theory in International Relations, requires a denial 
of this power-fetishism; its historical role as counsel to imperial ambition (Long and 
Schmidt, 2005) is transformed into an account of the necessary (and at times tragic) 
responsiveness  states  must  have  to  the  constraints  of  political  reality  (Mearsheimer, 
2001). This act of elision is most clearly seen in realists’ adoption of Niccolò Machiavelli 
as a patron saint, as the 15th century author is wrenched from the complex context in 
which  he  wrote  his  ironic  and  complex  counsel  for  the  new  Prince  of  renaissance 
Florence (Strauss, 1978, pp. 54-84), in order to provide insight into the timeless nature of 
conflict in international politics (Fischer, 1996, pp. 248-279). Without considering the 
revolutionary account of the  virtuous political community articulated by Machiavelli 
(Berlin,  1997),  which  celebrated  a  vigorous  republicanism  that  denied  the  universal 
Christian morality of his time and necessitated a space outside of political community 
that was not constrained by ethical imperatives (Walker, 1993), the realist tradition in 
International Relations has appropriated this antagonistic and hierarchical vision as a 
scientific theory. 
  No account of the inherent struggle for power in international politics is more 
influential  (or  ungrounded)  than  that  of  Hans  Morgenthau,  who  simply  asserted  a Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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psychological drive to justify the inescapable reality of dominance: 
 
The tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations, 
from  the  family  through  fraternal  and  professional  associations  and  local 
political  organizations,  to  the  state.  On  the  family  level,  the  typical  conflict 
between the mother-in-law and her child’s spouse is in its essence a struggle for 
power,  the  defense  of  an  established  power  position  against  the  attempt  to 
establish a new one. As such it foreshadows the conflict on the international 
scene between the policies of the status quo and the policies of imperialism. 
(Morgenthau, 1985, p. 39) 
 
While the reason that states face this imperative to dominate and struggle has become 
more  sophisticated,  whether  explained  psychologically  or  structurally  (Waltz,  1979; 
Molloy, 2006), it remains a view from a very particular viewpoint, from the perspective of 
established and conservative power – as it gives its (sometimes ambiguous) blessing to 
the given reality of dominance – no matter how fervently this politics of preservation is 
denied.  
 
In politics, the belief that certain facts are unalterable or certain trends irresistible 
commonly reflects a lack of desire or lack of interest to change or resist them. 
The impossibility of being a consistent and thorough-going realist is one of the 
most certain and most curious lessons of political science. Consistent realism 
excludes four things which appear to be essential ingredients of all effective 
political thinking: a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment 
and a ground for action. (Carr, 1964, p. 89) 
 
Despite the fact that Carr is consistently upheld as a paradigmatic realist (Wilson, 2000), 
his critique gets to the nub of the matter. When realists claim that utopians refuse to 
engage with the reality of the world they are themselves tilting at windmills. No one is 
anti-real; the problem with statist realism is that it takes a particular world as the world 
that is and, without acknowledging the fact, gives that world its blessing, judging the 
world of dominance to be a world we should accept.4 
At its base the utopian impulse is a belief in the necessity of a new reality, not a 
dreamy idealism that cannot countenance the relations and structures of power that 
define  international  politics.  This  belief  in  the  necessity  of  a  new  reality  requires 
identification with a reality other than that of dominance in two ways. First, to endeavour 
to change the world is to believe that reality can be changed, that the order of things is 
protean – it is a social ontology that is incompatible with realism’s focus on merely 
cyclical  change  and  the  persistence  of  basic  drives  and  structures.    This  is  what  the Egypt and the Failure of Realism, Hoover  
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standard realist critique rejects in utopian thinking, but utopianism also begins from a 
different reality. The utopian impulse draws its inspiration from dissatisfaction with the 
reality of dominance, judging it to be wanting. This leads to the identification of a reality 
of resistance, which looks to conditions of deprivation, uncertainty, and danger to justify 
opposition and coordinated efforts for social change. This critical and active approach to 
world politics is not, however, detached from the world, is not blind to reality – at least 
not necessarily – it is opposed to the reality of dominance, judges the conditions of the 
world to be wanting, and rejects the counsel of powerful actors to have patience, to 
manage transitions and not upset the order of things too much. 
  The  calls  for  Egyptian  protesters  or  for  those  expressing  solidarity  to  be 
realistic  were  not  calls  to  be  prudential,  accurate  and  thorough,  but  to  respect  the 
boundaries of the reality of dominance, to avoid knocking out the walls or pulling up the 
flooring in the house that power built. Robert Fisk (2011) is no less realistic in his analysis 
of the US response to Egypt, he just has the good sense to know that the situation in 
Egypt is disgraceful and the chance to help those women and men who bravely faced 
down the batons, knives and shields of state-agents should have been embraced because 
it  would  help  to  create  a  better  reality.  Commenting  on  Obama’s  handling  of  the 
situation he says: 
 
Had he rallied to the kind of democracy he preached here in Cairo six months 
after his investiture, had he called for the departure of this third-rate dictator a 
few days ago, the crowds would have been carrying US as well as Egyptian flags, 
and Washington would have done the impossible: it would have transformed 
the now familiar hatred of America (Afghanistan, Iraq, the “war on terror”, etc) 
into the more benign relationship which the US enjoyed in the balmy 1920s 
and 1930s and, indeed, despite its support for the creation of Israel, into the 
warmth that existed between Arab and American into the 1960s. But no. All 
this  was  squandered  in  just  seven  days  of  weakness  and  cowardice  in 
Washington – a gutlessness so at odds with the courage of the millions of 
Egyptians who tried to do what we in the West always demanded of them: to 
turn  their  dust-bowl  dictatorships  into  democracies.  They  supported 
democracy.  We  supported  “stability”,  “moderation”,  “restraint”,  “firm” 
leadership (Saddam Hussein-lite) soft “reform” and obedient Muslims. This 
failure of moral leadership in the West – under the false fear of “Islamisation” – 
may prove to be one of the greatest tragedies of the modern Middle East.  
(Fisk, 2011) 
 
Realists have no exclusive claim to the analysis of power, no special providence over Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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prudence, and the statist claim to represent reality is never its own justification. Until we 
study world politics from the perspective of those dominated at least as much as from the 
perspective of those who dominate, our study will remain a course book for statist and 
imperial management. 
  The rebellion in Egypt was an opportunity for the Obama administration to 
help bring about a momentous change in the dynamics of world politics – not for a 
political victory, but to make a contribution to the transformation of a problematic reality 
into a better one. Does anything justify his failure to act? I don’t think so. What explains 
this failure? I would suggest, at least in part, that it stems from the difficulty of escaping the 
reality of dominance – to see beyond the framing that prioritises state interests, stability 
and order as bulwarks against the constant threat of international anarchy, and which 
sanctified indifference to the suffering and aspirations of the Egyptian protestors among 
US and other western political elites. 
 
The  hypocrisy  of  western  liberals  is  breathtaking:  they  publicly  supported 
democracy, and now, when the people revolt against the tyrants on behalf of 
secular  freedom  and  justice,  not  on  behalf  of  religion,  they  are  all  deeply 
concerned. Why concern, why not joy that freedom is given a chance? Today, 
more than ever, Mao Zedong’s old motto is pertinent: “There is great chaos 
under heaven – the situation is excellent.” (Žižek, 2011) 
 
The Egyptian people were able to face down Mubarak’s apparatus of violence and make a 
start on putting an end to “corruption, injustice, poverty, and unemployment” through 
their effort to bring about a better reality with more equality and democracy – to support 
the state or the cause of order over those vulnerable bodies and brave people, even if it is 
with reticence, is not realism, but moral incompetence. 
 
Notes Notes Notes Notes
 
1 For a useful timeline of recent events in the North Africa and the Middle East see Blight 
& Pulham (2011).  
2 Crowley repeatedly calls for restraint on both sides, despite the obvious fact that it was 
Mubarak’s various forces – army, police and hired thugs – that were carrying out the 
most serious violence. Further demonstrating the administration’s unwillingness to 
condemn Mubarak, Crowley indicates that the US state department’s key concern was 
the blocking of Facebook and Twitter, rather than security services firing into the 
crowds with rubber-coated bullets and the illegal imprisonment of protestors – and of 
course completely missing the economic hardship and deprivation that were central to 
instigating the protests. Egypt and the Failure of Realism, Hoover  
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3 In International Relations, those who identify as realists are more accurately described 
as state-centric, pessimistic, convinced of the necessity of separating political analysis 
from morality and primarily concerned with conflict. The particular aspect of realism I 
am  critical  of  here  is  actually  shared  by  most  mainstream  figures  in  International 
Relations who focus on the reality experienced by political and other social elites; this 
would include contemporary liberal-institutionalism, classical and neo-realism and the 
English School, particularly those identified as “pluralists”.  
4 The acceptance of the reality of dominance is, however, complex – as often as not 
reflecting  resignation  rather  than  an  embrace  of  hegemonic  or  imperial  ambition. 
Morgenthau, in particular, has been singled out in recent years as a realist with a critical 
streak  that  who  sought  to  preserve  an  ethical  element  to  International  Relations 
scholarship – see Williams (2004).  
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